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1. Introduction 
The European postal markets are undergoing a reform which aims at promoting competition on the 
one hand and protecting the benefits of public services on the other. The important topics concerning 
postal regulation and the development of markets are: (1) market regime, (2) definition and financing 
of universal services, (3) market power control, and (4) emerging electronic substitution of postal 
services. The decrease in mail volumes due to electronic substitution is discussed in the literature (e.g., 
Nikali, 2008) and experts agree (see CIFS, 2009) that it will strongly impact the development of postal 
markets in the future. Crew et al. (2008) noted that finding an appropriate co-evolution of regulation 
and market development is one of the primary challenges of postal reform. The crucial question 
therefore is how the increasing convergence of postal and telecommunications markets can be 
mirrored by appropriate regulation (see also Crew and Kleindorfer, 2010). 
Except for the lack of a physical infrastructure, the postal sector is not entirely different from other 
network industries. The postal network is highly labour intensive and not subject to high investments 
or sunk costs.1 In a disaggregated approach to network regulation, postal markets are often analyzed 
along the value chain. Telecommunications markets are usually described based on their network 
layers. Following this ³QHWZRUNOD\HUVDSSURDFK´ the telecommunication network can be analyzed as 
consisting of a passive network layer including infrastructure, an active network layer, which sends 
and receives signals, and a third layer which represents the services and applications provided on this 
infrastructure.  
Postal ³Universal Services´ include a minimum range of products and services, together with 
constraints on accessibility to the postal infrastructure as well as quality and delivery frequency 
requirements. Postal operators have begun to invest in digital products and combine them with 
traditional physical postal services. Furthermore, they increasingly aim at installing secure digital 
identities for their customers to provide safe electronic communication. They therefore provide 
complementary products and applications, such as hybrid mail, based on the network operated by 
telecommunication providers.   
This increasing convergence between postal products and telecom applications is a new phenomenon 
which suggests the need for a co-evolution of regulation. But there is hardly any discussion in 
academia or in practice about the consequences for regulation. Relevant questions are: Which parts of 
current regulation will become redundant? Is there additional regulation needed due to new 
bottlenecks or changes in consumer behavior? In our qualitative analysis, we investigate the 
implications of intermodal competition and growing convergence between postal and 
telecommunications services on regulatory institutions and regimes. We set up a comparison between 
the networks and compare the scope of universal services and issues concerning market power 
regulation in the two different industries.  
In the remainder of the chapter, we will focus on the most prominent topics, namely the comparison of 
regulation in the telecommunications and the postal sector as well as on the implications for regulation 
of the growing convergence of the sectors. Section 2 introduces the economic foundation for our 
discussion. In Sections 3 and 4 we develop the idea of a technologically neutral multi-channel concept 
that allows for a combined communications universal service approach and convergence in regulation. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2. Foundations for Regulation in Network Industries: a Disaggregate Approach  
Based on different sources of market failures, there are several dimensions of regulation in network 
industries (e.g., Jaag and Trinkner, 2010). Bottleneck regulation is necessary if there is persistent 
market power from economies of scale, scope or density in combination with sunk costs. This allows 
an operator to ask prices above their efficient level and therefore results in an inefficient allocation. 
Regulation therefore applies to access regulation to those bottlenecks that are stable. 
Universal service and default service regulation assures the ubiquitous availability of good quality 
services at affordable prices. Among other things, it defines such obligations and financing and 
designates one or several operators to provide these services. From an economic point of view, 
universal service regulation is often justified on the basis of network externalities. Similarly, 
regulation of interconnection and interconnectivity can be explained by externalities between 
operators. This alludes to mutual termination and standards among operators.  
A third source of market failures is asymmetric information. Many regulations aim to cope with such 
asymmetries. Examples are flanking measures like data protection or safety regulations. 
According to the theory of contestable markets, the need for regulation of market power might arise 
where the cost structure exhibits cost subadditivity2 and irreversible costs at the same time. The theory 
has its origins in the work of Baumol et al. (1982). The presence of cost subadditivity and sunk costs 
DUHWKHGHILQLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRID³PRQRSROLVWLFERWWOHQHFN´,IWKLVERWWOHQHFNFDQQRWEHGXSOLFDWHG
QRUVXEVWLWXWHGE\RWKHUPHDQVLWLVFDOOHGD³VWDEOHPRQRSROLVWLFERWWOHQHFN´LQ86DQWLWUXVWODZWKLV
is referred tRDVDQ³HVVHQWLDOIDFLOLW\´6XFKLQIUDVWUXFWXUHVJLYHWKHRZQHUQDWXUDOPDUNHWSRZHUDQG
potential entrants will not be able to enter the market, even if the incumbent charges excessive prices.  
Figure 1: Approaches for network analysis: Telecommunications infrastructure vs. postal value chain 
(based on Jaag et al., 2009) 
 
Therefore, in liberalized markets it will be crucial to ensure that new market players get timely, non-
discriminatory access to stable bottleneck facilities at reasonable terms and conditions that prevent the 
abuse of market power. Where competition law is not sufficient to ensure such access, sector-specific 
regulations are necessary. Thereby, the property rights infringement inherent with access regulations 
should be kept to the minimal necessary amount. There are two main dimensions to minimizing such 
interventions.  
First, there are different regulatory instruments to ensure non-discriminatory access, for example ex-
post or ex-ante regulation of access prices, vertical separation, and others. These range from light 
regulation up to divestiture. See Jaag and Trinkner (2010) for a discussion of various models and a 
normative approach to assess the right regulatory remedy.  
Second, there are various options depending on how precisely the bottleneck can be identified. Knieps 
(2000) argues for a disaggregate approach, where only the bottleneck network layers or processes are 
regulated, all other services remain out of the scope of access regulations. Figure 1 illustrates the 
relevant network layers and processes in the telecommunications and postal markets. Each layer has a 
specific function in the network. Some layers may be fully competitive while others constitute stable 
monopolistic bottlenecks. The starting point of the disaggregate approach is the differentiation 
between those network layers or processes in which workable (actual and potential) competition is 
warranted and those in which there is stable market power. The latter can be expected in layers or 
processes that are monopolistic bottlenecks. 
This implies that both in telecommunications and in the postal sector, network layers or processes can 
and should be analyzed separately ± notwithstanding the strong connections among the layers. Often, 
monopolistic bottlenecks are located on layer 1 (the physical network infrastructure usually entailing 
considerable sunk costs) or in the capillary segments of the network (these segments usually entail 
subadditivity).  
While Knieps (2002) analyzes telecommunications markets by network layers, he argues for postal 
markets to be analyzed by processes along the value chain. However, this does not have to be 
necessarily the case: Heitzler (2009DSSOLHVWKH³value chain DSSURDFK´IRUWHOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQ
Figure 2 we show that by use of sufficient disaggregation, the postal market can be analyzed both 
along processes as well as along layers. 
Figure 2: Bottleneck analysis in the postal market along layers and/or processes 
 
When applying the disaggregate approach, it is important to investigate carefully the stability of 
bottlenecks. If the bottlenecks can be substituted by other means, it is not monopolistic anymore and 
there will be no need for regulation. Thus, with converging telecommunications and postal markets, 
one market might be a closer substitute for the other than it used to be in the past. This may reduce the 
stability of historical bottlenecks, as mobile telephony arguably did with respect to final mile 
competition in fixed line telephony. In particular, when considering access regulations, regulatory 
bodies need to understand both markets and their interactions.  
3. Regulation in Telecommunications and the Postal Sector 
Both the telecommunications and the postal sector have traditionally been regulated as publicly owned 
monopolies. With the introduction of direct competition in these sectors, their regulatory framework 
has changed considerably.Full liberalization in European telecommunications services and 
infrastructures (with delays for some member states) has been in place since 1998. According to the 
interconnection directive (97/33/EC), the general principle for interconnection agreements is free 
negotiation on a commercial basis. Following Laffont and Tirole (2000), pricing should be transparent, 
nondiscriminatory, and cost oriented.  
Regulation in the (wire-bound) telecommunications sector usually concentrates on the network layers 
constituting monopolistic bottlenecks (see Knieps, 2008 as well as Jaag and Trinkner, 2010). The 
relevant network layers are the wide-area and last-mile passive infrastructures (ducts, cables), active 
infrastructures (electronic equipment) and services. All last-mile infrastructures exhibit subadditive 
costs, and can therefore be considered to be natural PRQRSROLHV7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ
(2003/311/EC) mentioned eighteen relevant markets needing sector specific regulation. In 2007, the 
Commission cancelled eleven markets from the list (Recommendation 2007/679/EC). Knieps and 
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Zenhäusern (2009) argue that there is even more phasing-out potential. They show that only the last-
mile ducts and cables are a monopolistic bottleneck which cannot (readily) be duplicated. 
However, as there is increasing inter-modal competition (e.g., by wireless communication, or by new 
local loops established by electricity and cable companies) and fast technological progress (fiber 
optics), the traditional copper bottleneck in the last mile has become increasingly contested as well.  
The inclusion of telecommunications services into the definition of universal service may not only be 
justified by concerns of structural market power. Cremer et al. (2000) provide a series of alternative 
economic justifications: USO as a remedy for a network externality, USO as a redistribution policy 
instrument, USO as a means to supply a public good, USO as an instrument to conduct regional 
policy.3 
The Universal Service Directive (2002/22/EC) relating to electronic communications networks and 
services addresses universal service obligations and users' rights related to telecommunications. The 
'LUHFWLYH¶VDLPLVWRHQVXUHWKHXELTXLWRXVDYDLODELOLW\RIJRRGTXDOLW\VHUYLFHVYLDHIIHFWLYH
FRPSHWLWLRQDQGFKRLFHDQGWRGHDOZLWKFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQZKLFKXVHUV¶DQGFRQVXPHUV¶QHHGVDUHQRW
satisfactorily provided by commercial means. It defines a minimum set of services of specified quality 
to which all users and consumers should have access at an affordable price. 
In 2000, OFTEL (2000) stated that at present, ³high-bandwidth services do not meet the primary test 
for consideration as part of the USO requirement, because they are not yet services used by the 
PDMRULW\´2)7(/(2000) FRQWLQXHV³%XWWKH\DUHYHU\UDSLGO\GHYHORSLQJ7KLVSURJUHVVQHHGVWREH
kept under review alongside other factors relevant to the future of the USO, including the emerging 
EC framework, impacts on investment, funding, cross-subsidies, consumer demand and means of 
VXSSO\´:LWKWKHHPHUJHQFHRIZLGHO\XVHGVHFXUHPDLOVHUYLFHVDQGGLJLtal identities, electronic 
communication has become an increasingly close substitute for mail products. Therefore, regulation in 
telecommunications also affects hybrid forms of postal products. Postal service is one of the oldest 
network industries. Economics of bundling may play an important role on several stages of letter 
conveyance. However, alternative entry strategies emerge and can be observed in the sector: high 
quality letter services (e.g., express mail) as well as large volume mail delivery in selected areas. After 
the abolishition of all legal entry barriers, it is likely that the role of active competition will increase 
further.  
Market failures may arise from network externalities between operators, in analogy to the termination 
issue in mobile telecommunication. Jaag and Trinkner (2010) as well as Knieps et al. (2009) state that 
in that case, ex-post access regulation and the imposition of universal service obligations might be 
justified. Such regulaWRU\LQWHUYHQWLRQLVSDUWRIWKH7KLUG3RVWDO'LUHFWLYH(&³,WLVHVVHQWLDO
to guarantee at the Community level a universal postal service encompassing a minimum range of 
services of specified quality to be provided in all member states at an affordable price for the benefit 
RIDOOXVHUVLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHLUJHRJUDSKLFDOORFDWLRQLQWKH&RPPXQLW\´ 
As there are no significant sunk costs in the postal sector, there is no bottleneck facility, which would 
normally be the basis for access regulation or even divestiture. De Bijl et al. (2006) conclude´Our 
finding that there are no monopolistic bottlenecks in the delivery chain implies that the essential 
facility doctrine cannot be used to impose downstream access obligations upon the dominant postal 
RSHUDWRU´ Hence we argue that competition law should be sufficient to ensure efficient market 
outcomes. Nevertheless, access to post office boxes or information on change of addresses is often 
regulated in liberalized markets. With respect to postcode databases Dieke and Schölermann (2008) 
conclude that incumbent postal operators should be obliged to provide up-do-date information about 
postcodes and regulation should ensure that all postal operators have access related to these postcodes.  
4. Towards Unified Regulation 
In the following we explain how the telecommunications and postal sector are converging towards a 
unified communications market and we describe synergies in regulation. We argue that mail delivery 
can be either physical or via hybrid services. Following this line of argument, universal services 
become a technologically neutral multi-channel concept that allows for a technology neutral universal 
service approach.  
Converging Markets 
In liberalizing postal markets, the concern of cost efficiency arises both for the USP and the regulatory 
authority, since the monopoly as the traditional financing mechanism falls apart. The costs of some 
elements of the postal universal service are presumably high; therefore, universal service providers 
seek ways to abate them. As a result, an increasing number of postal operators have started to invest in 
digital solutions to combine them with traditional physical postal services (e.g., Maegli et al., 2007). 
Current pilot projects include virtual mailboxes (e.g., Belgian Post, Post Denmark, and Canada Post), 
electronic billing and e-government efforts. Incumbent operators increasingly aim at installing secure 
digital identities and provide complementary services based on the telecommunications network. The 
relevant question is whether the universal service will be the same in the future as well as whether the 
evolving technologies and customer needs are changing the definition and role of the universal service. 
Even though postal universal services might be considered as a fairly unvarying business during the 
past few centuries, a slow but constant change was common in its long history. From Victorian 
London, where mail delivery routes went up to twelve times per day, delivery frequency has been 
reduced over the years to five or six times per week. Today, rapid and data-intensive communications 
are secured by electronic means rather than by physical delivery of letter mail. In the coming decade, 
technological innovation will further expand communication possibilities and as market liberalization 
impacts postal operators, the RSHUDWRUV¶ historical and social role is likely to change further. 
Hybrid solutions could herald a new era in postal universal services. For example, Swiss Post 
introduced ³6ZLVV3RVW%R[´: a hybrid alternative and complement for the last mile delivery to 
households. Itella recently started a similar pilot project testing alternative delivery solutions, where 
physical mail is delivered twice a week. Arriving mail is stored in a PO box at the local postal office 
and receivers are informed via SMS. At the same time the letters are opened and scanned in order to 
send them electronically to the receiver by means of a special system. Other examples including 
telecommunication solutions to meet consumer needs and facilitate delivery are the PickPost-Solution 
of Swiss Post and the PickupPaket of Austrian Post. In the last name, the addressee is alerted 
instantaneously when a parcel is delivered at a designated shop defined by the receiver. 
These solutions have something in common: Components of the telecommunications infrastructure 
complement and substitute partially the traditional last mile delivery (e.g., safe electronic mailboxes). 
On the service level, new services have the potential to substitute traditional universal services (e.g., 
secured mail). Therefore, distinct universal service regulations across the two sectors are becoming 
more and more blurred. A key question moving forward will be: Is it necessary and efficient to have 
letter mail delivered every day? What are the alternatives? 
Electronic communication infrastructures and services allow for a nationwide use of 
telecommunications services at relatively low rates as well as for more flexibility in use than in 
physical communication. At the same time, national postal providers are mandated by law to provide 
cost-intensive postal services to every household nationwide due to the universal service obligation. 
The European definition of Universal Service in telecommunication services does not include explicit 
services and applications but requires the physical connection between households at affordable prices. 
Table 1 briefly summarizes various aspects of convergence in the telecommunications and postal 
markets concerning electronic communication. As mentioned in this Table, the two markets are 
converging in different areas. The most important driver of convergence is the evolution of consumer 
needs towards fast and secure access to messages (see CIFS 2009). The telecommunications network 
allows for acceleration of delivery at low costs while physical mail is more reliable but more costly. 
The convergence therefore relies on a combination of the strengths of both means to overcome their 
weaknesses.  
  
Table 1: Aspects of converging physical and electronic messaging services4 
 Post Telecommunications Trend towards 
convergence 
Consumer need Reliable written communication 
over long distances 
 
Written communication over long 
distances 
 
Yes, consumer ask for fast 
and reliable access to 
messages 
Product / 
Technology 
Letter mail and parcels DSL, wireless Yes, substitution by 
electronic messaging 
Frequency of 
service 
One per day (5 to 6 days per 
week) 
Continuous Driver for convergence - 
Speed Low 
Trend: lower (fewer deliveries per 
week) 
High 
Trend: differentiated (net non-
neutrality) 
Driver for convergence 
Coverage 
 
Nationwide Nationwide - 
Reliability Reliable Less reliable 
 
Yes, by digital IDs 
provided by postal 
operators 
Confidentiality, 
integrity 
 
High Rather low Yes, people trust in brands 
of postal operators 
Price High 
Trend: higher 
Low 
Trend: lower 
Driver for convergence 
Accessibility Postal retail outlets or post box 
criteria based on distance 
All residences and business offices 
on request 
Driver for convergence 
Scenario for USO 
reform 
Reform in delivery models and 
frequency 
Electronic convergence (fix and 
mobile infrastructure) or technology 
neutrality 
Increased minimum speed 
Yes, by hybrid services  
 
The increasing convergence between postal products and telecom applications is a new phenomenon 
which needs a corresponding co-evolution of regulation in order to exploit synergies and find proper 
universal service definitions in line with changing customer needs. Thus, rethinking the 
communications USO in general and the postal USO in particular is necessary. 
The concept of technological neutrality has a rationale in the telecommunications and the postal sector 
too. For example, Japan chose to regulate access to the last mile independent of the technology applied 
(copper or new fiber wires). Similarly, universal services are often defined in technologically neutral 
terms. Also, consumer needs may be technologically neutral. For example, the main needs of 
recipients concerning postal services are physical and timely delivery. They do not primarily care 
about how these needs are satisfied as long they are satisfied. That is, the technology used by the 
operator to fulfill these needs is not the primary concern of the receiver. Put differently, if the delivery 
of a particular type of correspondence serves the needs of the recipient, independently of different 
technologies, its delivery is technologically neutral. But do such technologies exist to assure that the 
delivery of letters and other items of correspondence can be accomplished in a technologically neutral 
manner?  
Hybrid services like Swiss Post Box improve physical delivery; it is the secure electronic complement 
to the physical letterbox. It guarantees a worldwide twenty-four-seven access to physical mail by 
scanning and emailing it in a secure unit as soon as it arrives at the sorting centre. Moreover, 
customers can decide to have the mail physically delivered, archived or shredded. Managing physical 
mail during a temporary absence becomes as easy as handling electronic messaging. As a prerequisite, 
broadband and mobile penetrations have to reach a critical mass. Thus, countries and governments that 
are strategically pushing forward their digital communications infrastructure will gain a substantial 
and long-lasting competitive advantage. In the case explained above, where mail delivery can be either 
physical or via hybrid services, universal services become a technologically neutral multi-channel 
concept. Technological convergence turns the technologies in the two markets to closer substitutes 
than in the past and functions therefore as the cutting-edge process for a technologically neutral 
universal service. A technologically neutral universal service has therefore an all-encompassing 
meaning in the communications sector and could also be referred to as ³communications universal 
service´, and the corresponding obligation as the ³communications universal service obligation´. 
Regulatory Institutions 
The European trend of establishing regulatory institutions leads toward integrated regulatory bodies. 
Most agencies are responsible for more than one sector. A majority of the EU members combine 
postal and electronic communications in one regulatory agency. In some member states the postal 
regulator is also involved in other network industries like gas, electricity, rail or even road safety (see 
WIK, 2009, p. 49). In the following we describe institutional solutions of cross-sectoral or integrated 
regulatory bodies, namely in Germany, France, Netherlands, UK and Switzerland. 
The Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and 
Railway is a separate higher federal authority within the German Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology. In 2005, the regulatory authority for telecommunications and postal services which 
replaced the Federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (BMPT) and the Federal Office for 
Posts and Telecommunications (BAPT), was renamed Federal Network Agency. The agency also acts 
as the root certification authority as provided by the German Electronic Signatures Act. The Federal 
Network Agency's task is to provide, by liberalization and deregulation, the further development of the 
German network industries. For the purpose of implementing the aims of regulation, the agency has 
effective procedures and instruments at its disposal including also rights of information and 
investigation as well as the right to impose graded sanctions.5 In practice, the various branches of the 
sector-specific regulators in the Bundesnetzagentur have only little to do with one and another and 
function as separate sector-specific regulators.   
The ART (Autorité de Regulation des Telecommunications) was created by the law of 1996 to 
regulate the telecommunications sector. In 2005 the Parliament decided to assign the responsibility for 
postal service regulation to the authority. Therefore, ART was renamed to ARCEP: Autorité de 
Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes. The former telecommunications 
regulator is charged by the legislature with the additional responsibility to oversee the opening and 
operation of postal markets as well as the financing and safeguarding of the universal service. The new 
French postal law of 2005 reorganized the statutory and regulatory governance of the postal sector. 
The French postal law (Code des Postes et des Communications Electroniques) covers postal services 
as well as the electronic communications.6 
The Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority of the Netherlands (OPTA) was established 
in the Netherlands in 1997. OPTA is allowed and required to set out the Independent Post and 
Telecommunications Authority Act, the Postal Act and the Telecommunications Act. On its website 
WKHUHJXODWRUVWDWHV³7KHGRPDLQVRIWHOHSKRQ\SRVWLQWHUQHWDQGWHOHYLVLRQDUHFKDQJLQJHYHU\GD\
New businesses are starting up and services are developing in a flash. There is a growing wave of new 
opportunities and subscriptions. OPTA ensures that there is competition and confidence in the 
communications sector in the interests of consumers. This mission revolves around two key points: the 
promotion of competition aQGWKHSURWHFWLRQRIFRQVXPHUV´7 0RUHRYHUWKH\FRQFOXGHWKDWWRGD\¶V
electronic communications will already be obsolete tomorrow. The integration of telecom and postal 
regulation seems to be motivated by technological reasons rather than by efficiency gains. 
Ofcom was established as a regulatory body by the Office of Communications Act 2002. Ofcom is the 
regulator for the UK communications industries, with responsibilities across television, radio, 
telecommunications and wireless communications services.8 The´Hooper RHSRUW´VKed light on 
GLYHUVHULVNVDQGXQFHUWDLQWLHVFRQFHUQLQJWKHIXWXUHRI8.¶VSRVWDOVHUYLFHV:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHVKDSH
of the sector-specific rHJXODWRU3RVWFRPPDQGWKHUHJXODWRU\UHJLPHWKHUHSRUWSURSRVHV³$QHZ
regulatory regime is needed to place postal regulation within the broader context of the 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVPDUNHWS´7KH+RRSHUReport mentioned several arguments for transferring 
responsibility for postal regulation from Postcomm to Ofcom: Postal services (1) are facing 
competition from digital media and Ofcom has a deep understanding of the entire communications 
sector as well as (2) experience of regulating markets facing fast technological change. Furthermore, 
the telecommunication regulator is (3) supposed to have experience of creating a regulatory 
framework for British Telecom while faced the challenge of modernization and liberalization. 
Nevertheless, Ofcom is (4) a large organization and has economies of scale and has (5) a deep 
understanding in market analysis and competition law.9 
A unique combination of responsibility is implemented in Switzerland. The Federal Communications 
Commission (ComCom) is the regulatory authority for the telecommunications market. The 
commission is not subject to any federal council or department directives. It is organizationally and 
legally independent of the administrative authorities.10 The Postal Services Regulation Authority 
(PostReg) is the regulatory authority for the postal market, which is not fully independent of the 
Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications. The peculiarity of 
the Swiss solution is the governance structure: currently, the two regulators are organizationally 
separated, but they share their chairman. 
Most European countries have already merged the postal and telecom regulators organizationally in 
order to realize economies of scale and concentrate expertise as well as experience. But, even if 
several countries cover the regulation of the two markets in the same bill, the responsibilities are still 
separated institutionally because the responsibilities for the two markets are typically completely 
separated in the different departments of the regulatory authority. However, the transformation of 
regulatory institutions argued for here suggests the need for a more unified and coordinated approach 
across postal and telecommunications, not only from an organizational but also from a regulatory 
point of view. This is so because the historically separately regulated services are becoming 
increasingly interdependent: (1) Telecom infrastructures are likely to substitute last mile mail delivery 
and (2) consumers are likely to demand a secure combination of electronic and physical mail. In the 
course of the increased substitutability of physical mail by electronic communications, it is not 
obvious how regulation in general and regulatory institutions in particular should co-evolve. However, 
it is clear that there are increasing interdependencies between these two sectors, suggesting that a 
coordinated regulatory strategy for the two sectors will be required. 
5. Conclusion 
The Third European Postal Directive leaves only little space for innovative digital services in fulfilling 
the obligations of the universal service. The idea of a unified universal service obligation mentioned 
above underlies a holistic understanding of the topic, which will end in the need for a unified 
regulatory approach. Such an approach will likely consist of a jointly defined universal service 
obligation and corresponding regulation, together with a regulatory regime for bottleneck resources, 
similar to the layer framework in the telecommunications market. 
Figure 3 summarizes the unified approach with a combined communications universal service 
definition and separated infrastructure regulation This approach is built on the original idea of 
universal service obligations: WRVDIHJXDUGWKHSXEOLF¶VDFFHVVWRDPLQLPXPUDQJHRIEDVLFVHUYLFHV. 
Under the concept of a communications universal service obligation, no matter how quickly 
communication technologies change, the right to a minimum level of communication is of high 
importance for the economic development of a society. Therefore, a unified definition of the universal 
service consists of the basic principle of having the possibility to communicate from senders to 
receivers no matter whether it is physical or electronic (layer 3 in figure 3). The infrastructure of the 
two sectors is still regulated separately where economically necessary. Access to stable bottlenecks 
should be assured by regulated access for all competitors, no matter if it was formerly financed by the 
state or by one or more competitors. As already shown in Figure 2, this applies only for roads in the 
physical postal production process. Non-discriminatory access to the road system is guaranteed 
through other government regulation and is not part of sector-specific regulation.11 In the 
telecommunications layer framework, only the passive infrastructures in the first layer (last mile 
cables, ducts or mobile radio infrastructure) constitute a bottleneck facility. In summary, the universal 
service is defined in layer three and regulates the physical electronic transport of messages from 
senders to receivers while bottleneck regulation is implemented in layer 1 where needed. 
Figure 3: The communications market with a unified approach for communications USO regulation 
 
How could this work in practice? If receivers are connected to a broadband network, they can receive 
the digitalized letters via email instantly. The physical delivery with a combined bundle of items 
happens two or three times a week, depending on the definition of the communications USO. With this 
FRPELQDWLRQRISK\VLFDODQGHOHFWURQLFPDLOWKHFXVWRPHU¶VQHHGIRUSK\VLFDODQGfast delivery is 
satisfied. For the special case of high value or emotional value mail as for example love letters, or for 
the case of very urgent mail, it is still possible to pick up the item at the PO box or to order physical 
delivery two or three times per week.  
Despite strong competition from electronic communications means, there is still a demand for physical 
mail. Apart from the strategic challenges for postal operators arising from electronic competition with 
traditional mail products (e.g. Crew and Kleindorfer, 2010), this paper has argued that future 
discussions on the evolution of postal services should focus on the following central questions: ± How 
can the concept of postal services in combination with digital solutions be redefined? How can such 
combinations be incorporated in the definition of universal services? How should access and work-
sharing regulations be redefined to accommodate the convergence noted and the innovations in hybrid 
communications that are growing in importance? In light of the answers to these questions, evolving 
solutions must be developed to continue to address the primary objective of regulation: delivering and 
enabling what consumers want and what they are willing to pay for.  
                                                     
 
Notes: 
* Corresponding author: martin.maegli@post.ch 
  
1
 The necessary resources are not related to significant sunk (respectively fixed) costs; but they are 
rather scalable variable costs (such as labor costs) or disposable assets (e.g., vehicles or post offices). 
2
 Subadditivity implies that the cost of producing a set of outputs as a whole are less than the costs of 
producing the same output subdivided in any combination of subsets. See Baumol et al 1982 for a 
definition. 
3
 Laffont and Tirole (2000) give a comprehensive overview on foundations of Universal Services in 
telecommunications. 
4
 Partially adopted from IPC (2010). 
5
 http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de 
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Layer 3, services 
Buildings 
Counter IT 
Roads ** 
Vehicles 
Machines 
Mailboxes 
P.O. boxes 
Letter drops 
Sender services / Originating services (physical, electronic) * 
Sorting IT 
In-house wiring ** 
Last mile buildings, ducts, cabinets, cables ** 
Recipient services / Termination services (physical, electronic) * 
Network management 
Signaling devices 
Terminal equipment 
Mobile networks 
** Universal Service Regulation  
** Bottleneck Regulation 
*** Subject to other Government Regulation 
 
Long distance buildings, ducts, cabinets, cables 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6
 http://www.arcep.fr 
7
 http://www.opta.nl/en/about-opta/tomorrow-is-made-today/ 
8
 http://www.ofcom.org.uk 
9
 The relevant postal services bill is currently under discussion and the transfer of the responsibilities 
has so far not been realized. See http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2008-09/postalservices.html 
10
 http://www.comcom.admin.ch/index.html?lang=en 
11
 The sole bottleneck facility in the delivery of postal items is the road system (similar to the last mile 
in telecom), where non-discriminatory access is guaranteed to everyone by the state. Naturally, roads 
are not in the scope of the postal regulation. 
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